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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action based upon an alleged breach of a 
service station lease held by Defendant covering certain 
real property owned by Plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
Summary Judgment was granted the Defendant dis-
missing with prejudice certain of the Plaintiff's claims 
for relief and concluding the lease was valid and in full 
force and effect. Def end ant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was denied as to Plaintiff's remaining claims 
for relief and the motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judg-
ment as to the remaining claims was granted declaring 
Defendant breached the said lease. Defendant was en-
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joined from use and possession of the subject property 
and a determination of damages was reserved for trial. 
After trial on damages, judgment was entered in favor of 
Plaintiff in the amount of $7,535.60. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment denying 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, reversal of 
the Summary Judgment and the Judgment for damages 
granted Plaintiff, and an order of this Court that this 
case be remanded with proper instructions to grant De-
fendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, or such other 
proceedings as the Court deems necessary and proper. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 17, 1954, Plaintiff's predecessor in inter-
est, Lavine White, mother of Plaintiff, entered into two 
written lease agreements, one covering real property, and 
the other a service station and improvements (herein-
after collectively referred to as "the Lease") with De-
fendant's predecessor in interest, General Petroleum 
Corporation (General Petroleum Corporation was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant and has since 
merged into defendant, the latter assuming all rights and 
obligations of General Petroleum Corporation, and here-
inafter reference will only be made to Def end ant). The 
lease provided that Defendant, for a rental of $300.00 
per month, shall have the use and possession of certain 
described premises, together with improvements and per-
sonal property thereon, for a period of 120 months com-
mencing with the date of completion and possession of 
the improvements necessary to operate a gas and oil serv-
ice station (R. 116). The improvements on the said prop-
erty were completed May 1, 1955, and the initial period 
of 120 months commenced on that date. As further con-
sideration the lease provided that Defendant contribute 
$7 ,500.00 to the construction of a service station and im-
provements on the property. The lease granted to De-
fendant options to renew for three successive periods of 
five years each following the initial term. It was further 
provided in the lease that Defendant could terminate the 
lease if it determined that the operation of the service 
station was not feasible by giving Plaintiff thirty days 
written notice and paying one month's rent. The other 
provisions of the lease set forth numerous other rights, 
duties and obligations of the parties (R. 116-121). 
Lavine White by Warranty Deed dated July 20, 1959, 
granted to Plaintiff the property embraced by the lease. 
On May 4, 1964, the lease was assigned to Plaintiff by 
Lavine White. 
By letter dated February 25, 1965, Plaintiff advised 
Defendant that it was her contention the options to re-
new in the lease were ''continuing offers'' which she was 
withdrawing (R. 58). Defendant replied stating that this 
was erroneous and exercised its first option to renew the 
lease for five years by letter dated March 16, 1965 
(R. 60, 61). 
Plaintiff has refused to acknowledge Defendant's 
renewal of the lease pursuant to the option granted there-
in and commenced this action on June 3, 1965. 
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POINT I 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A CONTRACT 
' IMPLIED OR 0 THE R WISE, BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT TO THE EF-
FECT THAT DEFENDANT WOULD NOT 
RENEW AND EXTEND THE LEASE, NOR IS 
THERE EVIDENCE OF ANY CONDUCT ON 
THE PART OF DEFENDANT WHICH 
WOULD ESTOP IT FROM RENEWING AND 
EXTENDING THE SAME. 
The first conclusion of law of the lower court states: 
"By defendant's representations not to renew the 
lease and plaintiff's detrimental reliance thereon 
there exists an implied contract to the effect that 
the defendant was bound to not renew its option 
and its renewal of said option constitutes a breach 
of that implied contract.'' 
The record is without evidence to show Defendant made 
any representations not to renew the lease or that Plain-
tiff detrimentally relied upon any representations. But 
aside from the lack of evidence, research reveals no au-
thority whatsoever to support the conclusion or one 
which even suggests that detrimental reliance on the 
part of one party is sufficient to create an implied con-
tract. If the conclusion is to be construed literally, then 
we have no further argument than that already made. 
However, because of the use of the terms implied con-
tract and detrimental reliance, the conclusion may be 
based upon either implied contract or estoppel, and there-
fore, a discussion of both principles will be made. 
It is elementary that contracts implied in fact are 
exactly like expressed contracts in their elements and 
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must be supported by consideration. Chwndler v. Roach, 
319 P. 2d 776, Cal. App. (1968). The only distinction 
between expressed and implied contracts is that the for-
mer is supported by an actual promise and the latter by 
the unambiguous conduct of the parties. All other essen-
tial elements to a contract, such as consideration, consent 
and meeting of the minds, are requisite to the creation of 
both types of contract. 17 C.J.S. § 4, pp. 554 to 562. 
Except for the lease, Defendant is at a loss as to how, 
when and where it entered into a contract expressed or 
implied with Plaintiff. Nothing in the record remotely 
implies that the Defendant by representations, conduct 
or otherwise agreed or inf erred it would not renew the 
lease. There is not anything in the record to show the 
elements of contract were satisfied. Plaintiff approached 
Defendant and negotiated in an attempt to have Defend-
ant firm up two of its five year options to renew and raise 
the rental under the lease. Defendant did not accept any 
proposal by Plaintiff and Plaintiff readily admits not 
only in her disposition but in her complaint that she did 
not accept the proposal made by Defendant, which was 
the result of her request and the negotiations conducted 
between her and Defendant (R. 2, 92-P. 18). No one 
could contend that such negotiations resulted in a meet-
ing of the minds, and no one could contend that either 
party consented to anything other than to reject each 
other's proposal. Moreover, for Defendant to give up 
its right to renew the lease, it would certainly require 
some consideration from Plaintiff. The record is abso-
lutely devoid of any facts which would even slightly inf er 
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or suggest that Defendant received consideration of any 
kind to abandon its rights. 
Detrimental reliance is most commonly an element 
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. In 31 C.J.S. § 67, 
p. 402, it is stated that: 
"In order to constitute an equitable estoppel, 
estoppel by conduct, or estoppel of pais there must 
exist a false representation or concealment of ma-
terial facts; it must have been made with knowl-
edge, actual or constructive, of the facts; the 
party to whom it was made must have been with-
out knowledge or the means of knowledge of the 
real facts; it must have been made with the in-
tention that it should be acted on; and the party 
to whom it was made must have relied o:µ or acted 
on it to his prejudice.'' 
Further in the same section at pages 406 and 407, it is 
stated that : 
''There can be no estoppel if any of the requisite 
elements thereof are wanting. They are each of 
equal importance.'' 
In Kelly v. Richards, et al., 83 P.2d 731, 95 Utah 560, 
(1938), at page 734, the court stated: 
"It is essential therefore that the representation, 
whether it arises by words, acts or conduct, must 
have been of a material fact; that it must have 
been wilfully intended to lead the party setting up 
the estoppel to act upon it or that there must have 
been a reasonable grounds and cause to think that 
because thereof he would change his position or do 
some act or take some course on faith in the con-
duct and that such action results to his detriment 
if the person sought to be estopped may not re-
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pudiate the words of interpretation being placed 
upon such conduct.'' 
A party raising estoppel must have relied to his loss, 
upon misrepresentation or conduct amounting to misrep-
resentation or concealment of material facts. Cook v. 
Cook, 174 Pac. 434, 110 Utah 406, 1946. 
In Petty v. Gindy MatY/!Ufacturing Corporation, 404 
P .2d 30, 17 Utah 2d 32, 1965, this court in ref erring to re-
quirements of promissory estoppel stated, at page 32: 
'' ... the promise or representation relied on must 
be sufficiently definite and certain that promissee 
acting as a reasonable and prudent person under 
circumstances would be justified in placing re-
liance upon it and, in case of an uncertainty or 
doubt, responsibility is upon a promissee to ascer-
tain facts before acting upon it.'' 
Plaintiff has not shown that she relied upon any par-
ticular conduct of the Defendant; nor has she shown that 
she has relied upon conduct of defendant to her loss. If, 
as Plaintiff claims, she relied upon Defendant not exer-
cising its option to renew the lease, she would have had 
no need whatsoever to send a letter to Defendant advis-
ing it that the options to renew in the lease were nothing 
more than continuing offers which she was rescinding. 
The letter was silent as to any reliance by her upon 
any conduct or representation of Defendant or that 
she had a contract, implied or otherwise, with the Defend-
ant whereby the latter had contracted away its right to 
renew. Obviously, there had been no meeting of the 
minds or consent. 
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To establish estoppel, Defendant must have intended 
or, at least assumed, that Plaintiff would have acted in 
the way she claims to have. If such evidence appears in 
the record, Defendant would appreciate having its atten. 
tion drawn to it. 
Whatever inferences or acts Plaintiff claims to have 
relied upon are not apparent and obviously not definite 
and certain. It would thus seem only reasonable and pru-
dent that prior to obligating herself, if she had, Plaintiff 
would have obtained assurances as to Defendant's in-
tentions. 
Thus, under any of the discussed theories, it is evi-
dent there is neither law nor fact supporting a conclusion 
that Defendant was bound by implied contract not to re-
new or was estopped from renewing the lease because of 
Defendant's representations or conduct or for any other 
reason. 
POINT II 
A PROVISION IN THE LEASE GRANTING 
DEFENDANT THE OPTION TO TERMINATE 
THE LEASE UPON GIVING 30 DAYS' NO-
TICE AND PAYMENT OF ONE MONTH'S 
RENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LACK OF 
CONSIDERATION OR MUTUALITY SO AS 
TO RENDER THE ENTIRE LEASE NULL 
AND VOID. 
It is a well established rule that where a contract is 
supported by other than mutual promises of the parties 
the right to cancel or terminate the contract at any time 
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by only one party is valid and enforceable. This principle 
is clearly stated in 17 C.J.S., § 100 (6), page 807, as 
follows: 
''Where a contract is supported by a sufficient 
consideration the fact that, under its terms, a 
right to cancel or terminate is given to one or both 
parties does not render it invalid or unenf orce-
able for lack of mutuality.'' 
At page 808 of the same section it states: 
''A contract may be valid and not wanting in 
mutuality even though it gives a right to cancel 
where such right must be exercised by an affirma-
tive act, regardless of whether cancellation must 
be for cause. So, a contract under which one or 
both parties reserves a right or option to termi-
nate on giving reasonable notice, or a stated notice 
. . . has been held not illusory and without effect 
for lack of mutuality.'' 
A recent case on this point is K eek v. Brookfield, 409 
P.2d 583, 2 Ariz. App. 424 (1966). In that case, which is 
in point here, lessor argues that a lease was void for lack 
of mutuality because it provided that lessee had the right 
to terminate upon the giving of 30 days' notice. In 
reply to that contention the court at page 586 said: 
"Mutuality is absent when only one of the con-
tracting parties is bound to perform. Where 
there are mutual promises between the parties, as 
there are here, it is not necessary to render a par-
ticular promise by one party not binding that 
there be a special promise on the part of the 
other party directed to that particular obligation. 
Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar Co., 41 Ariz. 376, 
381, 18 P. 2d 649 ( 1933). There being sufficient 
consideration, the validity of the lease is not af-
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fected by the fact that the lessees had an option 
to terminate while the lessors had no correlative 
right.'' 
In the instant case, the position of Defendant is even 
stronger than that of the lessee in the Keck case. A read-
ing of the lease readily shows the parties here not 
only had several mutual promises and consideration 
supporting the agreement, but also, with regard to 
the specific termination provision, Defendant had to 
give Plaintiff a 30 days' written notice and payment 
of one month's rent before termination could be 
effective. Additionally, Defendant could only termi-
nate the operation of the service station if it be-
came unfeasible. The fa.ct that feasibility is a con-
dition to Defendant's termination of the lease would re-
quire Defendant to act in good faith and, if necessary, 
prove that operation of the station was not feasible. 
This court has stated in Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 
237 P. 2d 823, Utah (1951), that a clause giving one party 
the right to terminate upon a stated notice does not make 
the contract unenforceable for lack of mutuality. The 
fact situation in that case differs in the instant case in 
that both parties had the right to terminate, but thi~ 
Court recognized in discussion of the question of the 
right to terminate that it was not necessary to the va-
lidity of the contract to provide both parties with that 
right. 
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POINT III. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING OF AN IMPLIED COVENANT TO 
INCREASE RENTAL OR SHARE PROFITS 
UNDER THE LEASE. 
The law governing implied covenants has long been 
established by the courts, and it may be stated generally 
that courts do not favor implied covenants and will de-
clare them to exist only if necessary. Gou.sins Investment 
Company v. Ha.sting Clothing Company, 113 P.2d 878, 45 
Ca. 2d 141 (1941). In the often cited Gou.sins case, the 
California Court said, at page 882, the rules controlling 
exercise of judicial authority to assert implied covenant 
may be stated as follows: 
''The implication must arise from the language 
or it must be indispensable to effectuate intention 
of parties ; it must appear from language used 
that it was so clearly within the contemplation of 
the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to ex-
press it; implied co-venants can only be justified 
on grounds of legal necessity; a promise can be 
implied only where it can be rightfully assumed 
that it would ha-ve been made if attention had been 
called to it; there can be no implied covenant 
where the subject is completely covered by con-
tract.'' 
The California court went on to quote at great length 
from another noted case, Freeport Sulphur Co. v. Ameri-
can Sulphur Royalty Co., 117 Tex. 439, 6 S.W.2d 1039, 
( 1941) 60 A.L.R. 890. The quote is as follows: 
''The court cannot make contracts for parties, and 
can declare implied covenants to exist only when 
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there is a satisfactory basis in the express con-
tracts of the parties which makes it necessary to 
imply certain duties and obligations in order to 
effect the purpose of the parties in the contracts 
made. Before a covenant will be implied in the 
express terms of a contract, and in some cases in 
view of the customers and practices of the busi-
ness to which the contract relates, it must appear 
therefrom that it was so clearly in the contempla-
tion of the parties as that they deemed it unneces-
sary to express it, and therefore omitted to do so, 
or that it is necessary to imply such covenant in 
order to give effect to and effectuate the purpose 
of the contract as a whole. The Supreme Court 
of West Virginia, in the case of Grass v. Big Creek 
Developmen.t Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S.E. 750, 
L.R.A. ( 1915), 1057, states the rule as follows: 
'Implied covenants can only be justified upon 
the ground of legal necessity. Such a necessity 
may arise out of the terms of the contract or out 
of the substance thereof. One absolutely neces-
sary to the operation of the contract and the effec-
tuation of its purpose is necessarily implied 
whether inferable from any particular words or 
not. It is not enough to say it is necessary to make 
the contract fair, or that it ought to have con-
tained a stipulation which is not found in it, or 
that, without such covenant, it would be improvi-
dent or unwise or would operate unjustly; for 
men have the right to make such contracts. Ac-
cordingly courts hesitate to read into contracts 
anything by way of implication, and never do it 
except upon grounds of obvious necessity.' " 
It certainly cannot be said that the language of the 
lease gives rise to the implication that Plaintiff is entitled 
to additional rentals or a sharing of profits. Not only 
does the lease provide that it embodies expressly all 
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agreements between the parties, but it is completely silent 
and without any reference to what Plaintiff contends, and 
silence on the point cannot be assumed to raise impli-
cations. We submit the lease was intentionally silent as 
to Plaintiff's claim because neither of the parties intend-
ed such a provision to be included. It can hardly be as-
sumed that it was a point considered to he unnecessary 
to express. One would have to believe that a party entitled 
to share profits or adjust remuneration would include the 
point in an agreement. If the rental was to be increased 
or profits shared, what would be the basis to calculate the 
amounts to be paid? Plaintiff cannot deny that the lease 
received the scrutiny of the original parties. An examina-
tion of the document itself shows that many words, sen-
tences and paragraphs were added to or deleted from the 
basic form used for the agreement. 
Although implied covenants are raised by the 
language of a ontract and extraneous factors are not 
to be considered, Defendant contends that even the 
conduct of the parties opposes Plaintiff's position. 
It is significant that during ten years of the nn-
tial term of the lease, the stated monthly rental was 
paid hy Defendant and neither Plaintiff nor her 
mother made the contention proposed here. In fact, 
until Plaintiff refused to recognize Defendant's exercise 
of its option to renew, the parties seem to have acted in 
accordance with the lease's clear and unambiguous lan-
guage. Thus, it appears obvious the parties bad ex-
pressed their understanding of the lease by their own 
conduct over a period of several years. 
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Defendant submits that Plaintiff's real contention is 
that she is no longer satisfied with her bargain and now 
is of the opinion that it is unfair to her. If this is true, 
Plaintiff is still without standing under the Law. As 
stated in the Cousins Investment Company case it is not 
enough to say covenants should he implied because a con-
tract is unfair or no longer satisfactory to one party. It 
is hornbook law that a party cannot rescind or alter a 
contract on the grounds that he believes it to be a bad 
bargain or the consideration is no longer adequate. The 
courts have long held that parties suffering no disabilities 
are in a better position to determine the adequacies of 
their own contract, and the courts hesitate to interfere. 
17 Am J ur 2d 102, § 102, p. 445 to 448. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court has apparently entered Summary 
Judgment for Plaintiff only on the three points argued in 
this brief. The law is clear as to what facts must exist 
under point one to find for Plaintiff. However, Evidence 
to support Plaintiff's contention that Defendant by im-
plied contract or estoppel was barred from renewing and 
extending the lease is completely absent from the records. 
We have often echoed that in our argument, but the only 
fact is that there a re no facts. Nothing more can be said 
and we find no reason to elaborate further. 
As to our points two and three the law is clear as 
to what facts must exist to support Plaintiff's claims. 
Defendant also believes that the record is complete and 
clear in that the lease itself is really all Plaintiff has 
14 
asked to have interpreted. The certainty of the language 
relating to Defendant's option to terminate is not in ques-
tion. Plaintiff's contention that the lease lacks mutuality 
is met squarely in K eek v. Brookfield and is denied by 
this court in Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy. Aside from 
numerous mutual promises between the parties and the 
rental paid by Defendant, there is separate consideration 
for that right and the necessity of Defendant to satisfy a 
condition before exercising it. 
In regard to the finding of implied covenants, there 
is a stated rental and no inference to rental adjustment 
or profit sharing. The intention of the parties is ex-
pressed, as are their rights and duties. Nothing more is 
required of either party than can be reasonably deter-
mined from a reading of the plain language in the lease 
and nothing more should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE E. BOSS, ESQ. 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant Socony Mobile 
Oil Company 
